Appendix M: Elements of Criticism, John Frost, Ed., 1831
Excerpts from an abridgment of Elements of Criticism by Henry Home, Lord Kames prepared for use in American common schools and academies.
Advertisement of the American Editor
In preparing the present abridgment of Lord Kames’s Elements of Criticism for publication, free use has been made of Jamieson’s abridgment, published in London in 1823. It has been found necessary, however, to deviate from his plan in several particulars.
The size of the book has been considerably reduced, by omitting portions of which the practical utility was not sufficiently apparent to justify their being retained in a work intended for general use.
All quotations of which the delicacy was in the slightest degree questionable, have been omitted, as also quotations in the ancient and foreign languages.
Certain of the terms used by Lord Kames in explaining the passions and emotions, have been altered with reference to the advanced state of intellectual philosophy.
Questions have been attached to the whole work, with a view to direct the attention of the student to the leading principles and their illustrations. Some instructers, of course, will dispense with these in examining their pupils, and question them, in their own way, on the text: but it is presumed that the value of the work will not be diminished, even for these instructers, by the addition of the questions.
The mode, in which the examples are to be recited, and their fitness pointed out, by the pupil, must of course be left to the judgment of the instructor.
The Editor indulges the hope, that the present attempt to bring a standard work of criticism within reach of the inmates of our common schools and academies, may meet with the approbation of those of his fellow-citizens who feel interested in the important subject of general education.
Introduction
The design of the present undertaking is, to examine the sensitive branch of human nature, to trace the objects that are naturally agreeable, as well as those that are naturally disagreeable; and by these means to discover, if we can, what are the genuine principles of the fine arts. The man who aspires to be a critic in these arts, must pierce still deeper: he must acquire a clear perception of what objects are lofty, what low, what proper or improper, what manly, and what mean or trivial. Hence a foundation for reasoning upon the taste of any individual, and for passing sentence upon it. Where it is conformable to principles, we can pronounce with certainty that it is correct; otherwise, that it is incorrect, and perhaps whimsical. Thus the fine arts, like morals, become a rational science; and, like morals, may be cultivated to a high degree of refinement.
Manifold are the advantages of criticism, when thus studied as a rational science. In the first place, a thorough acquaintance with the principles of the fine arts, redoubles the pleasure we derive from them. To the man who resigns himself entirely to sentiment or feeling, without interposing any sort of judgment, poetry, music and painting, are mere pastime: in the prime of life, indeed, they are delightful, being supported by the force of novelty and the heat of imagination: but in time they lose their relish, and are generally neglected in the maturity of life, which disposes to more serious and more important occupations. To those who deal in criticism as a regular science, governed by just principles, and giving scope to judgment as well as to fancy, the fine arts are a favorite entertainment; and in old age they maintain that relish which they produce in the morning of life.
In the next place, a philosophic inquiry into the principles of the fine arts, inures the reflecting mind to the most enticing sort of logic: the practice of reasoning upon subjects so agreeable, tends to a habit; and a habit, strengthening the reasoning faculties, prepares the mind for entering into subjects more intricate and abstract. To have, in that respect, a just conception of the importance of criticism, we need but reflect upon the common method of education; which, after some years spent in acquiring languages, hurries us, without the least preparatory discipline, into the most profound philosophy. A more effectual method to alienate the tender mind from abstract science, is beyond the reach of invention: and accordingly, with respect to such speculations, the bulk of our youth contract a sort of hobgoblin terror, which is seldom if ever subdued. Those who apply to the arts, are trained in a very different manner: they are led, step by step, from the easier parts of the operation, to what are more difficult; and are not permitted to make a new motion till they are perfected in those which go before. Thus the science of criticism may be considered as a middle link, connecting the different parts of education into a regular chain. This science furnishes an inviting opportunity to exercise the judgment: we delight to reason upon subjects that are equally pleasant and familiar: we proceed gradually from the simpler to the more involved cases: and in a due course of discipline, custom, which improves all our faculties, bestows acuteness on that of reason, sufficient to unravel all the intricacies of philosophy.
Nor ought it to be overlooked, that the reasonings employed on the fine arts, are of the same kind with those which regulate our conduct. Mathematical and metaphysical reasonings have no tendency to improve social intercourse; nor are they applicable to the common affairs of life: but just a taste of the fine arts, derived from rational principles, furnishes elegant subjects for conversation, and prepares us for acting in the social state with dignity and propriety.
The science of rational criticism tends to improve the heart no less than the understanding. It tends, in the first place, to moderate the selfish affections: by sweetening and harmonizing the temper, it is a strong antidote to the turbulence of passion and violence of pursuit: it procures to a man so much mental enjoyment, that in order to be occupied, he is not tempted to deliver up his youth to hunting, gaming, drinking; nor his middle age to ambition; nor his old age to avarice. Pride and envy, two disgustful passions, find in the constitution no enemy more formidable than a delicate and discerning taste: the man upon whom nature and culture have bestowed this blessing, feels great delight in the virtuous dispositions and actions of others: he loves to cherish them, and to publish them to the world: faults and failings, it is true, are to him not less obvious; but these he avoids, or removes out of sight, because they give him pain. On the other hand, a man devoid of taste, upon whom even striking beauties make but a faint impression, indulges pride or envy without control, and loves to brood over errors and blemishes; in a word, there are other passions, that, upon occasion, may disturb the peace of society more than those mentioned; but not another passion is so unwearied antagonist to the sweets of social intercourse: pride and envy put a man perpetually in opposition to others, and dispose him to relish bad more than good qualities, even in a companion. How different that disposition of mind, where every virtue in a companion or neighbor, is, by refinement of taste, set in its strongest light, and defects or blemishes natural to all are suppressed, or kept out of view?
In the next place, delicacy of taste tends not less to invigorate the social affections, than to moderate those that are selfish. To be convinced of that tendency, we need only reflect that delicacy of taste necessarily heightens our feeling of pain and pleasure; and of course our sympathy, which is the capital branch of every social passion. Sympathy invites a communication of joys and sorrows, hopes and fears: such exercise, soothing and satisfactory in itself, is necessarily productive of mutual good-will and affection.
One other advantage of criticism is reserved to the last place, being of all the most important; which is, that it is a great support to morality. I insist on it with entire satisfaction, that no occupation attaches a man more to his duty, than that of cultivating a taste in the fine arts: a just relish for what is beautiful, proper, elegant, and ornamental, in writing or painting, in architecture or gardening,
is a fine preparation for the same just relish of these qualities in character and behavior. To the man who has acquired a taste so acute and accomplished, every action, wrong or improper, must be highly disgustful: if, in any instance, the everbearing power of passion sway him from his duty, he returns to it with a doubled resolution never to be swayed a second time: he has now an additional motive to virtue, a conviction derived from experience, that happiness depends on regularity and order, and that disregard to justice or propriety never fails to be punished with shame and remorse.
With respect to the present undertaking, it is not the author’s intention to compose a regular treatise upon each of the fine arts; but only in general to exhibit their fundamental principles, drawn from human nature, the true source of criticism. The fine arts are intended to entertain us, by making pleasant impressions, and, by that circumstance, are distinguished from the useful arts: but in order to make pleasant impressions, we ought, as above hinted, to know what objects are naturally agreeable, and what naturally disagreeable. That subject is here attempted, so far as necessary for unfolding the genuine principles of the fine arts; and the author assumes no merit from his performance, but that of evincing, perhaps more distinctly than hitherto has been done, that these principles, as well as every just rule of criticism, are founded upon the sensitive part of our nature. What the author has discovered or collected upon that subject, he chooses to impart in the gay and agreeable form of criticism; imagining that this form will be more relished, and perhaps be not less instructive, than a regular and labored disquisition. His plan is, to ascend gradually to principles, from facts and experiments; instead of beginning with the former, handled abstractly, and descending to the latter. But though criticism be thus his only declared aim, he will not disown, that all along it has been his view to explain the nature of man, considered as a sensitive being, capable of pleasure and pain: and though he flatters himself with having made some progress in that important science, he is however too sensible of its extent and difficulty, to undertake it professedly, or to avow it as the chief purpose of the present work.
Review
What is the design of this work?
What is requisite in order to become a critic in the fine arts?
What do the fine arts thus become?
What is the first advantage which arises from an acquaintance with the the fine arts?
To whom are the fine arts a favorite entertainment?
What habit is acquired by philosophic inquiry into the principles of the fine arts?
How may the science of criticism be considered?
Of what kind are the reasonings employed on the fine arts?
What does a just taste for the fine arts furnish?
How does the science of criticism tend to improve the heart?
To what vices is a discerning taste an enemy?
In what does the man of taste delight?
What does delicacy of taste invigorate?
What is the last and most important advantage of criticism?
What occupation particularly attaches a man to his duty?
What additional motive to virtue has the man of taste?
From what are the fundamental principles of criticism drawn?
Upon what is every just rule of criticism founded?
What is the author’s plan?
What other object besides the science of criticism has the author kept in view?
Chapter III: Beauty
BEAUTY, the most noted of all the qualities that belong to single objects, is a term which, in its native signification, is appropriated to objects of sight.
A tree, the simplest object of external sense, presents to us color, figure, size, and sometimes motion. The beauty of the human figure is extraordinary, being a composition of numberless beauties, arising from the parts and qualities of the objects; various colors, various motions, figures, size, &c. all unite in one complex object, and strike the eye with combined force. Hence it is, that beauty, a quality so remarkable in visible objects, lends its name to express every thing that is eminently agreeable: thus, by a figure of speech, we say a beautiful sound, a beautiful thought or expression, a beautiful theorem, a beautiful event, a beautiful discovery in art or science. But, as figurative expression is the subject of a following chapter, this chapter is confined to beauty in its proper signification.
It is natural to suppose, that a perception so various as that of beauty, comprehending sometimes many particulars, sometimes few, should occasion emotions equally various; and yet all the various emotions of beauty maintain one common character, that of sweetness and gaiety.
Considering attentively the beauty of visible objects, we discover two kinds: first, intrinsic beauty, because it is discovered in a single object viewed apart without relation to any other: the examples above given are of that kind. The other, relative beauty, being founded on the relation of objects. The purposed distribution would lead me to handle these beauties separately; but they are frequently so intimately connected, that, for the sake of connexion, I am forced to vary the plan, and to bring them both into the same chapter. Intrinsic beauty is an object of sense merely: to perceive the beauty of a spreading oak, or of a flowing river, no more is required but singly an act of vision. The perception of relative beauty, is accompanied with an act of understanding and reflection, and of means relating to some good end or purpose. Intrinsic beauty is ultimate; and the beauty of effect is transferred to the cause. A subject void of beauty, appears beautiful from its utility, as an old gothic tower, considered as a defence against an enemy; a dwelling-house, from its conveniences. When these beauties coincide in any object, it appears delightful. The beauty of utility requires no illustration. The beauty of color is too familiar to need explanation.
Let us inquire into the beauty of figure, as arising from regularity, uniformity, proportion, order and simplicity.
To inquire why an object, by means of these particulars, appears beautiful, would be a vain attempt: it seems that the nature of man was originally framed with a relish for them, to answer wise and good purposes. To explain these purposes or final causes, though a subject of great importance, has scarce been attempted by any writer. One thing is evident, that our relish for the particulars mentioned adds beauty to the objects that surround us, and tends to our happiness: and the Author of our nature has given many signal proofs that this final cause is not below his care. We may be confirmed in this thought upon reflecting, that our taste for these particulars is not accidental, but uniform and universal, making a branch of our nature. At the same time, it ought not to he overlooked, that regularity, uniformity, order and simplicity, contribute each of them to readiness of apprehension; enabling us to form more distinct images of objects, than can be done with the utmost attention where these particulars are not found. With respect to proportion, it is in some instances connected with a useful end, as in animals, where the best proportioned are the strongest and most active; but instances are still more numerous, where the proportions we relish have no connexion with utility. Writers on architecture insist much on the proportions of a column, and assign different proportions to the Doric, Ionic, and Corinthian; but no architect will maintain, that accurate proportions contribute more to use than several that are less accurate and less agreeable.
With respect to the beauty of figures, we confine ourselves to the simplest. A circle and a square are cast perfectly regular; yet a square is less beautiful than a circle, because a circle is a single object, and makes one entire impression, whereas a square is composed of four sides or objects. A square is more beautiful than a hexagon; though each is perfectly regular.
A square is more regular than a parallelogram, and its parts more uniform; and for these reasons it is more beautiful. But that holds with respect to intrinsic beauty only; for in many instances utility turns the scale on the side of the parallelogram: this figure for the doors and windows of a dwelling-house is preferred, because of utility; and here the beauty of utility prevails over that of regularity and uniformity.
A parallelogram again depends, for its beauty, on the proportion of its sides: a great inequality of sides annihilates its beauty. Approximation towards equality hath the same effect; for proportion there degenerates into imperfect uniformity, and the figure appears an unsuccessful attempt towards a square. And thus proportion contributes to beauty.
An equilateral triangle yields not to a square in regularity, nor in uniformity of parts, and it is more simple. But an equilateral triangle is less beautiful than a square, which must be owing to inferiority of order in the position of its parts; the sides of an equilateral triangle incline to each other in the same angle, being the most perfect order they are susceptible of; but this order is obscure, and far from being so perfect as the parallelism of the sides of a square. Thus order contributes to the beauty of visible objects, no less than simplicity, regularity, or proportion.
Uniformity is singular in one capital circumstance, that it is apt to disgust by excess: a number of things destined for the same use, such as windows, chairs, spoons, buttons, cannot be too uniform; for supposing their figure to be good, utility requires uniformity: but a scrupulous uniformity of parts in a large garden or field, is far from being agreeable. Uniformity among connected objects belongs not to the present subject: it is handled in the chapter of uniformity and variety.
In all the works of Nature, simplicity makes an illustrious figure. It also makes a figure in works of art: profuse ornament in painting, gardening, or architecture, as well as in dress or in language, shows a mean or corrupted taste:—
Poets, like painters, thus unskill’d to trace
The naked nature and the living grace,
With gold and jewels cover every part,
And hide with ornaments their want of art.
Pope’s Essay on Criticism.
Simplicity in behavior has an enchanting effect, and never fails to gain our affection. And we take great delight in the laws of motion, which, with the greatest simplicity, are boundless in their operations.
In the fine arts, simplicity has degenerated into artificial refinement. In literary productions and music, the degeneracy is much greater.
Review
To what is the term beauty originally applied?
Give examples.
To what things is it extended by a figure of speech?
Give examples.
What is the common character of all the emotions of beauty?
What is intrinsic beauty ? —relative beauty?
How do they differ?
Is the relish for beauty of figure inherent ?
What is its. use?
How do regularity, &c. aid the mind?
What is the use of proportion ?
Why is a square less beautiful than a circle?
When is a square less beautiful than a parallelogram?
On what does the beauty of a parallelogram depend?
Why is an equilateral triangle less beautiful than a square?
Does order contribute to beauty?
In what is uniformity singular?
Illustrate this.
Is simplicity important?
Quote Pope’s remark on the want of simplicity.
What is the effect of simplicity in behavior?
What is the present state of the fine arts and literature with respect to simplicity?
Source: John Frost, ed., An Abridgment of Elements of Criticism by the Honorable Henry Home of Kames (Philadelphia: Towar: J. & D. M. Hogan, 1831), pp. iii-viii and 50-54